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 Rio All Suite Hotel & Casino (“Rio”) and a third-party administrator appealed to district 
court a finding that Kathryn Phillips (“Phillips”), a Rio employee who fractured her ankle on a 
staircase during the course of her employment, was entitled to workers‟ compensation.  The 
district court entered an order denying Rio‟s petition for judicial review.  At issue is the standard 
applied to determine whether an employee seeking workers‟ compensation benefits has 
demonstrated that her injury “arose out of” her employment under NRS 616C.150(1) when her 
injury was caused by a neutral risk. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 In situations in which an employee‟s injury is caused by a neutral risk – that is, a risk that 
is neither personal to the employee nor solely employment-related – the Supreme Court adopts 
the increased-risk test, which evaluates whether the employee was exposed to a risk greater than 
that faced by the general public.  In the instant case, because the frequency with which Phillips 
was required to use the stairs subjected her to a greater risk of injury than the risk faced by the 
general public, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court‟s order.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Phillips worked at Rio as a poker and blackjack dealer.  In October 2006, whilst taking a 
mandatory 20-minute break during her usual eight-hour shift, Phillips injured her ankle when 
walking down the stairs to the employees‟ break room.  She did not slip or fall down the stairs; 
Phillips merely “twisted over” and fractured her ankle on her descent.  Phillips did not allege the 
stairs were defective or cluttered with debris.  She filled out a workers‟ compensation form the 
next day. 
 In November 2006, Rio‟s third-party administrator denied Phillips‟ claim because she did 
not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury arose out of the course of her 
employment, pursuant to NRS 616C.150(1).  Phillips requested a hearing from the Nevada 
Department of Administration, Hearings Division.  The hearing officer affirmed Rio‟s third-
party administrator, citing the Nevada Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. Clark County Sch. 
Dist.
2
  Phillips appealed that decision and the appeals officer reversed it.  The appeals officer 
distinguished Mitchell from Phillips‟ action because Phillips‟ injury did not result from an 
unexplained fall. 
 Rio and its third-party administrator petitioned for judicial review of the appeals officer‟s 
decision.  The district court denied the petition for judicial review because the appeals officer‟s 
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 121 Nev. 179, 111 P.3d 1104 (2005). 
decision did not violate NRS 233B.135(3).  Rio and its third-party administrator appealed that 
decision to the Nevada Supreme Court. 
 
Discussion 
 Under NRS § 616C.150(1), an employee must “establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his or her employment.”  
Rio disputes that Phillips‟ injury “arose out of” her employment.   
 The Court first interpreted the phrase “arose out of” in Rio Suite Hotel & Casino v. 
Gorsky.
3
  In Gorsky, a casino employee fell while walking on a flat surface that was clear of 
debris.  The Court concluded that the employee‟s injury failed the “arose out of” prong of NRS 
616C.150(1) because his fall was the result of his multiple sclerosis.  The Court held that “the 
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act is not a mechanism which makes employers absolutely liable 
for injuries suffered by employees who are „on the job.‟”4  An employee must demonstrate a link 
“between the workplace conditions and how those conditions caused the injury.5  Subsequently, 
in Mitchell v. Clark County Sch. Dist., the Court affirmed Gorsky, finding no causal connection 
for Mitchell‟s injury when she could not explain how the conditions of her employment caused 
her to fall on a flat surface.
6
   
The Court then categorized the three types of risk that an employee may encounter during 
employment: (1) those that are solely employment related; (2) those that are purely personal; and 
(3) those that are neutral.
7
  Injuries resulting from employment related risks are the obvious kinds 
of work related injuries – such as falling on slippery grounds at a work site – and are generally 
compensable.  Injuries that are purely personal are those that cannot possibly be attributed to the 
employment, such as those seen, supra, in Gorsky and Mitchell.  Neutral risks are neither 
distinctly employment nor distinctly personal in nature.  Here, Phillips injury falls within the 
neutral risk category.   
 To determine whether an injury from a neutral risk “arose out of” the employment, the 
Court analyzed three different tests used by courts in sister states.  The first two tests, the actual-
risk test and the positional-risk test, were quickly rejected.  The Court reasoned that these two 
tests were very similar in language and application and resulted in outcomes inconsistent with 
the neutral construction of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act by favoring employees and 
reducing the analysis of NRS § 616C.150(1) to a “but for” test.   
 Instead, the Court adopted the increased-risk test.   This test allows an employee to 
recover if she proves her injury resulted from a risk “greater than that to which the general public 
[is] exposed.”8  Under this test, an injury resulting from a common risk may be compensable if 
the employee was exposed to this common risk more frequently than the general public.  The 
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Court also noted that under this test, it does not matter whether the fall is explained or 
unexplained as long as the employee can show that she faced a greater risk than the general 
public.  The Court found that this test balanced the rights of workers and the rights of employers 
and maintained neutrality in evaluating NRS § 616C.150(1).     
 
Conclusion 
 Under the increased-risk test, Phillips injury “arose out of” the course of her employment.  
Phillips was required to take six periodic breaks during her eight-hour shifts.  The only means of 
accessing the employee breakroom during these mandatory breaks required that Phillips traverse 
two-flights of stairs.  Thus, while traversing stairs is not a particularly risky action, Phillips was 
subjected to the risk at a much higher frequency than the general public, and therefore her injury 
“arose out of” the course of her employment. 
